COMMENTS
In Willful Disregard of the Employment Security
Act: Culpability and the Determination of
Disqualifying Misconduct by the Courts
James Levy*
In Washington, a claimant for unemployment compensation
benefits is disqualified from receiving those benefits if he or she has
been "discharged or suspended for misconduct connected with his or
her work. '"' Before 1993, no statutory definition of misconduct
existed. The Washington courts generated their own definitions of and
tests for misconduct. The Washington State Legislature, in 1993,
created a statutory definition of misconduct that disqualifies a claimant
from receiving unemployment compensation benefits.2 Unlike some
judicial definitions, 3 the legislative definition is concise: "'Misconduct'
means an employee's act or failure to act in willful disregard of his or
her employer's interest, where the effect of the employee's act or failure
to act is to harm the employer's business." 4
Washington courts have not uniformly interpreted the statutory
definition. There are three elements to this definition: (1) an
employee's act or failure to act (conduct); (2) the act or omission is
done in willful disregard of her employer's interest (culpability); and
(3) the effect of the act or omission is harm to the employer's business
(harm).' Courts have not dealt directly with the legal issue of what
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1. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.060 (1996).
2. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.04.293 (1993); Act of July 25, 1993 ch. 483, § 1, 1993 Wash.
Laws 2017, 2017.
3. See infra Part II.A.1-4.
4. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.04.293 (1993).
5. Id.
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constitutes conduct under the definition, i.e., an act or failure to act,6
though they have been clear that the determination of the particular
conduct for which the claimant was terminated is a question of fact.7
The harm element has been briefly addressed by some courts.8 The
elements of conduct and harm, however, are beyond the scope of this
Comment, and will not be discussed in any detail.
In applying the statutory definition of misconduct, Washington
appellate courts have differed significantly on the second element, the
level of culpability required. On this issue, a split has developed
between Divisions One and Three of the Washington Courts of
Appeal. Division One has generated a broad test for misconduct based
on several principles. 9 Division Three has developed a narrower test,
including in the definition of misconduct only intentional behavior."
Division Two has not yet decided a case involving the statutory
definition. 1
This Comment argues that the most appropriate test for applying
the statutory definition is an objective test based on knowing disregard
of the employer's interests by the employee, rather than any current
interpretation of the definition by the courts of Washington. In
Section One of this Comment, the policies behind the Employment
Security Act and the ramifications of different culpability elements are
discussed. Section Two details the different tests for misconduct
generated by the courts. Part A of Section Two discusses the common
law tests and their culpability elements prior to the 1993 statutory
definition of misconduct. Part B discusses the more recent tests and
culpability elements generated by the courts to interpret the statutory
definition of misconduct. Section Three argues that the policy of the
Employment Security Act and the legislative history of the 1993

6. Conceivably, a situation could arise in which an employee is fired for someone else's act
or omission; for example, an employee could be fired because of a supervisor's failure to stop an
employee's misconduct, or an employee could be discharged because of a family member's act.
7. See Keenan v. Employment Sec. Dept., 81 Wash. App. 391, 395, 914 P.2d 1191, 1193
(1996). Theoretically, a case could turn on which particular conduct the court determines to be
the alleged misconduct. See id.
8. Generally, where harm to the employer's business is required, courts both prior to and
since the adoption of the statutory definition have recognized intangible, noneconomic harm as
well as tangible, economic harm. See, e.g., Peterson v. Dept. of Employment Sec., 42 Wash. App.
364, 370-71, 711 P.2d 1071, 1075 (1985); Dermond v. Employment Sec. Dept., 89 Wash. App.
128, 133-36, 947 P.2d 1271, 1274-75 (1997).
9. Wilson v. Employment Sec. Dept., 87 Wash. App. 197, 201-04, 940 P.2d 269, 272-73
(1997).
10. Keenan, 81 Wash. App. at 395, 914 P.2d at 1193.
11. Division Two may consider the issue within the next year, however, in Rice v. Employment Sec. Dept., No. 22615-4-I1 (Wash. Ct. App. filed Nov. 14, 1997).
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statutory definition best support an objective test with a knowing
disregard culpability element as the appropriate interpretation of the
statutory definition.
I.

THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT AND THE RAMIFICATIONS
OF A CULPABILITY ELEMENT

The Employment Security Act (Act) was enacted in 1937 to help
alleviate the financial burden on individuals due to unemployment
resulting from the Depression, and the subsequent drain on the state
and national economy.12 The Preamble states that the purpose of the
Act is to set aside funds for an unemployment reserve to be used "for
the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own."13
It goes on to state that in interpreting the Act, "this title shall be
liberally construed for the purpose of reducing involuntary unemployment and the suffering caused thereby to the minimum."' 4 Employment Security collects funds from employers and distributes them to
the unemployed, creating a form of risk sharing."5
The exclusion of an individual from unemployment compensation
for misconduct 6 may be viewed in light of the preamble to the Act,
relating to the statutory purpose of reducing the suffering caused by
involuntary unemployment." Because of the statutory mandate to
liberally construe the Act, Washington courts have generally viewed
with caution any statutory construction that limits coverage.'
A narrow culpability test will result in fewer determinations of
disqualifying misconduct, providing benefits to more claimants who
might not receive them under a different test. A narrow test will,
however, also result in increased cost to both the State and employers,
and potentially undermine employers' efforts to reduce misconduct in
the workplace. A broader culpability test, on the other hand, will
result in denial of benefits to many more individuals, resulting in a
reduced cost to both employers and the State.
A culpability test with predictable results will also be beneficial,
as it may reduce the social costs involved, through the ability of

12.

Unemployment Compensation Act of 1937, ch. 162, 1937 Wash. Laws 574.

13.

WASH. REV. CODE § 50.01.010 (1996).

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.060 (1996).
17. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.01.010 (1996).
18. See Shoreline Community College Dist. No. 7 v. Employment Sec. Dept., 120 Wash.
2d 394, 842 P.2d 938 (1992); Penick v. Employment Sec. Dept., 82 Wash. App. 30, 917 P.2d
136 (1996), review denied, 130 Wash. 2d 1004, 925 P.2d 989 (1997).
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businesses to plan, decreased litigation, efficient litigation, and the
possibility of deterrence. Determination of the appropriate interpretation of the culpability element for disqualifying misconduct is therefore
very important, with ramifications for every worker and employer.
II.

JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF CULPABILITY

Prior to the 1993 statutory definition, codified at Washington
Revised Code 50.04.293, the boundaries of disqualifying misconduct
and culpability elements and tests were based on policies and principles
adopted and developed from case law. 19 After the statutory definition
took effect, the courts needed to interpret specific language in that
20
definition: "in willful disregard of his or her employer's interests.
In determining whether a worker's behavior or omission is
misconduct, a court must reference the appropriate definition of
misconduct, then apply a test to determine whether the facts of that
particular case meet that definition. 21 Occasionally, the behavior or
omission is so clearly misconduct that the court may apply the
statutory definition directly as a test. 22 Many times, however, in cases
with less straightforward facts, the court must move away from the
statutory definition and adopt or develop a test with different language
as a proxy for that definition. 3 The focus of this Comment is on the
culpability element of each test for misconduct adopted by the courts,
whether that test comes from the statutory definition of misconduct or
from a definition developed by the courts to fit specific situations.
For analysis purposes, the culpability elements of the misconduct
tests developed by Washington's courts and legislature can be divided
into two types: the standard-based elements and the principle-based
elements. The standard-based elements include a single criterion that
the claimant's conduct must satisfy in order to be classified as
misconduct. For example, a culpability element which requires
negligent behavior is standard-based. A worker must have acted at
least negligently in order to be disqualified from receiving benefits for
misconduct. A worker fired for intentional misconduct would also be

19. See, e.g., Nelson v. Dept. of Employment Sec., 98 Wash. 2d 370, 375, 655 P.2d 242,
245 (1985); Peterson, 42 Wash. App. at 370, 711 P.2d at 1075.
20. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.04.293 (1993).

21. See, e.g., Wilson v. Employment Sec. Dept., 87 Wash. App. 197, 940 P.2d 269 (1997).
22. See, e.g., Keenan v. Employment Sec. Dept., 91 Wash. App. 391, 914 P.2d 1191
(1996).
23. See, e.g., Dermond v. Employment Sec. Dept., 89 Wash. App. 128, 947 P.2d 1271
(1997).
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disqualified, since her behavior or omission would be beyond the
culpability criterion of negligent behavior.
In contrast, some culpability elements are made up of multiple
principles which together define a boundary of misconduct. This
principle-based culpability element is not based on a solitary criterion
as discussed above. An example of a principle-based culpability
element would be one stating that (1) inefficiency and poor performance do not constitute misconduct, but (2) misbehavior within the
employee's control, which is repeated after warnings, does constitute
misconduct. This example is principle-based because it relies on
multiple situations to establish a rough boundary for behavior which
can be defined as misconduct. In using this type of principle-based
culpability element, a court would determine whether the claimant's
behavior was mere inefficiency and poor performance, or whether it
was in her control and continued after warnings to stop.
Definitions Prior to the Adoption of the Disqualifying
Misconduct Statute
There were four different tests for misconduct generated by
Washington courts prior to the promulgation of the statutory
definition. The first of these tests contained a culpability element
which was a combination of standard-based and principle-based
elements. Two other tests contained standard-based culpability
elements, and the most recent test contained a principle-based
culpability element.
A.

1. Willful or Wanton Disregard
The first test of culpability for misconduct cases in Washington
provided a general standard-based culpability element with more
precise illustrations. It also contained a complementary principle-based
aspect. In Willard v. Employment Sec. Dept.,24 Division One of the
Court of Appeals adopted the leading national test for disqualifying
misconduct:
the intended meaning of the term "misconduct," ... is limited to
conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's
interests as is found in[:]
(1) deliberate violations or disregard of standards of 'behavior
which the employer has the right to expect of his employee, or

24.

10 Wash. App. 437, 517 P.2d 973 (1974).
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in carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to
manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or
to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to his
employer.
On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct,
failure in good performance as the result of inability or
incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated
instances, or good-faith errors in judgment or discretion are
not to be deemed "misconduct" within the meaning of the
25
statute.

The court in Willard characterized the essential issue in applying
this test for misconduct as determining "whether the conduct of the
employee manifests 'willful or wanton disregard of the employer's
interests."' '26 In Willard, hotel maids refused an order by hotel
management to clean an extra room, believing that this would violate
their unwritten bargaining agreement.
In applying the test, the
court held that the refusal was an "unreasonable and intentional
disregard of their employer's interest which amounted to 'misconduct'
within the meaning of RCW 50.20.060,''28despite the maids' belief
that the rule violated an oral labor agreement.
Division Three of the Court of Appeals, in Shaw v. Employment
Sec. Dept.,29 adopted the "willful or wanton disregard" test set out in
Willard.3" In holding that a tardy employee did not exhibit "willful
or wanton disregard of [his] employer's interest," the Shaw court
looked to the frequency of and the reasons for the tardiness.3 The
claimant was late 14 times in 15 months and the final instance of
tardiness before his termination was for a good reason.3 2 The court
held that the claimant's tardiness did not constitute misconduct, stating
that it applied the test consistently with "the principle that the
disqualification provisions in the unemployment compensation act are

25. Id. at 444, 517 P.2d at 977-78 (emphasis and enumeration added) (citing Boynton Cab
Co. v. Newbeck, 296 N.W. 636 (Wis. 1941)).
26. Id. at 445, 517 P.2d at 978 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.060 (1996)).
27. Id. at 438, 517 P.2d at 974.
28. Id. at 446-47, 517 P.2d at 978-79.
29. 46 Wash. App. 610, 731 P.2d 1121 (1987).
30. Id. at 613-14, 731 P.2d at 1123.
31. Id. at 614, 731 P.2d at 1123.
32. Id. at 611-12, 731 P.2d at 1122.
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liberally construed in favor of the employee."33 The court emphasized that each case had to be decided on its own facts."
2. Intentional Disobedience
In reaction to the convoluted "willful or wanton disregard"
standard adopted in Willard, Division Two of the Court of Appeals
applied a standard-based culpability element based on intentional
disobedience in Durham v. Department of Employment Security.3" The
Durham court reiterated the policy behind the Employment Security
Act: "to provide for those who become unemployed through no fault
of their own."36 In Durham, the claimants walked away from a job
draining a furnace of molten copper after a direct order to stay and
finish the job.3 It was clear to the workers that they would have to
38
work overtime to complete the job, which they refused to do.
Replacement workers completed the job in five minutes.39
The court reviewed Willard and, after rejecting the "willful or
wanton disregard" test, generated its own test for determining disqualifying misconduct:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The employer's order must have been reasonable.
The employee's disobedience must have been intentional.
The consequences of disobedience to the employer must have
been of substance and not merely trivial.
There must have been no overriding health or safety factors to
excuse disobedience.4 °

In applying the test, the court held that (1) the order to stay was
"manifestly reasonable," (2) the claimants' disobedience was "obviously
intentional," (3) there were potentially very serious consequences, and
(4) no mitigating health or safety factors were present. 41 Consequently, the court held that the claimants were fired for misconduct
connected to their work.4 2 The claimants should have obeyed the
order to finish the job and submitted a grievance under the collective
bargaining agreement instead of walking off the job.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 615, 731 P.2d at 1124.
Id. at 614-15, 731 P.2d at 1123.
31 Wash. App. 675, 644 P.2d 154 (1982).
Id. at 678, 644 P.2d at 157 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 50.01.010 (1996)).
Id. at 677, 644 P.2d at 156.
Id.
Id.
Durham, 31 Wash. App. at 679, 644 P.2d at 157.
Id.
Id.
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The intentional disobedience culpability element was again used
by Division Two in Darneille v. Department of Employment Security,43
in which the court affirmed the test set out in Durham and explicitly
rejected the "willful or wanton disregard" test adopted in Willard."
Claimant Darneille, a cashier, was repeatedly counseled and warned
about errors in cash register procedure." After being disciplined and
put on probation, she committed two more errors and was subsequently terminated.4 6 The administrative law judge found these errors to
be unintentional and negligent.47
The determinative issue before the Darneille court was whether
the claimant's acts which led to her termination were done intentionally; in other words, whether she subjectively "intend[ed] to disobey the
employer's rules or orders. '48 In applying the intentional disobedience test, the court held that Darneille had no intent to cause the
errors, even though Darneille repeatedly violated the rules after
warnings from her employer. 49 Therefore, her state of mind did not
rise to the level of culpability required by the test.
3.

Knowing Disregard

The Washington Supreme Court generated its own test for
misconduct in Nelson v. Department of Employment Security,"° which
included a culpability element based on knowing disregard of the
employer's interests. The claimant, a cashier for the employer, was
arrested for and pleaded guilty to shoplifting.5 1 Because of the
employer's concern regarding the claimant's lack of trustworthiness,
she was fired after informing her supervisor of the conviction. 2 The
shoplifting occurred while the claimant was not on duty, and not on
the premises of the employer.5 3
In concluding that the claimant's off-duty criminal behavior was
not misconduct, the court adopted a test with a clear culpability
standard requiring knowledge or intent of harm to the employer:

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

49 Wash. App. 575, 744 P.2d 1091 (1987).
Id. at 577-78, 744 P.2d at 1093.
Id. at 576-77, 744 P.2d at 1092.
Id. at 576, 744 P.2d at 1092.
Id.
Darneille, 49 Wash. App. at 578, 744 P.2d at 1094.
Id. at 579, 744 P.2d at 1094.
98 Wash. 2d 370, 655 P.2d 242 (1982).
Id. at 371, 655 P.2d at 243.
Id. at 371-72, 655 P.2d at 243.
Id.
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[T]he employee's conduct (1) had some nexus with her work; (2)
resulted in some harm to the employer's interest; and (3) was in fact
conduct which was (a) violative of some code of behavior contracted
for between employer and employee, and (b) done with intent or
knowledge that the employer's interest would suffer. 4
The court stressed that the contractual agreement need not be formal
or written, but could be in the form of "reasonable rules and regulations of the employer of which the employee has knowledge and is
expected to follow."5 5 Therefore, the employee had to have actual
knowledge of the rule for his acts to be labeled misconduct.
The court determined that Nelson's act of shoplifting was not
directly related to her job as a cashier. Her employer fired her because
of the employer's concern about her trustworthiness, not because of
any rule violation.56 The court stressed that for behavior occurring
outside the scope and course of employment to be considered
of a rule or regulation
misconduct, the employer must show a violation
57
reasonably related to the employer's business.
4.

Principle-Based Tests

Recognizing that the willful or wanton disregard test was
confusing, the Washington Supreme Court set out a more workable
test based on principles invoked in other cases. The court developed
this test implicitly in Macey v. Department of Employment Security,5"
and then the court refined and explicitly stated the test in Tapper v.
Employment Security Department.59 The Macey court characterized the
knowing disregard standard developed in Nelson as applying only to
off-the-job, off-premises cases, as a contrast to the court's newly
6°
adopted principle-based test applying to on-duty or on-site cases.
The claimant in Macey gave a false answer in response to a resume
question regarding past criminal convictions.6" After working for the
employer for six years, he was fired after the employer found out about
62
a past conviction.

54.
55.

Id. at 375, 655 P.2d at 245.
Nelson, 98 Wash. 2d at 374, 655 P.2d at 244.

56.
57.

Id. at 371, 655 P.2d at 243.
Id. at 374, 655 P.2d at 244-45 (citing Glese v. Employment Div., 557 P.2d 1354, 1357

(Or. Ct. App. 1976)).

58.

110 Wash. 2d 308, 752 P.2d 372 (1988).

59.

122 Wash. 2d 397, 858 P.2d 494 (1993).

60.
61.
62.

Macey, 110 Wash. 2d at 314-15, 752 P.2d at 376.
Id. at 310, 752 P.2d at 373.
Id. at 310-11, 752 P.2d at 373.
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The court emphasized that the focus of the Act was on the
conduct and fault of the employee.63 In reformulating a test for
disqualifying misconduct, the court framed the test in the policy and
purpose of the Employment Security Act: "The policy of the act is to
'benefit... persons unemployed through no fault of their own'; the act
is to be liberally construed for the purpose of reducing involuntary
unemployment. ' 64 The court stated that misconduct connected with
the employee's work would be disqualifying if it was such that
unemployment was "in effect voluntary. '6' The test developed by
the court contained three elements: (1) the rule or regulation "must be
reasonable under the circumstances of employment"; (2) the conduct
must be connected with the employee's work; and (3) the misconduct
must violate the rule.66
While not explicitly developing a culpability element, the Macey
court stated some principles touching on the state of mind necessary
for disqualifying misconduct: (1) "unsatisfactory job performance
whether stemming from inability to perform, errors of judgment or
ordinary negligence does not constitute misconduct"; (2) intentional
conduct is disqualifying misconduct if it also satisfies the three criteria
above; (3) intentional conduct is not necessary to show misconduct;
and (4) "repeated, but unexcused acts, especially after notice or
rules, may be of sufficient
warnings or in violation of established
67
magnitude to constitute misconduct.
In applying the test and these culpability principles to the facts of
the case, the Macey court held that writing a false answer to a question
regarding past criminal convictions constituted misconduct. 68 The
application question and the employer's decision to fire the worker
were reasonable, especially where the applicant was not necessarily
barred from employment if he had had a criminal conviction.69 The
false answer was connected to the employee's work because the
employer legitimately expected and relied upon an honest answer.70
Finally, the employee intentionally supplied a false answer, because he
was afraid he would not be hired if he told the truth about his prior

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 318, 752 P.2d at 377.
Id. at 315-16, 752 P.2d at 376 (quoting WASH. REv. CODE § 50.01.010 (1996)).
Macey, 110 Wash. 2d at 316, 752 P.2d at 376.
Id.
Id. at 318, 752 P.2d at 377-78.
Id. at 321, 752 P.2d at 379.
Id. at 320, 752 P.2d at 378.
Macey, 110 Wash. 2d at 320, 752 P.2d at 378.
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conviction and his current parole status.7' As the misconduct in
question was intentional, the culpability requirements outlined in the
principles were met.7 2
In Tapper v. Employment Security Department, the court explicitly
expanded the principle-based culpability element implied by Macey by
adding a fourth element to the Macey test:
(4) The violations must be intentional, grossly negligent, or
continue to take place after notice or warnings. That is, the
behavior cannot be characterized as mere incompetence, inefficiency,
erroneous judgment, or ordinary negligence.73
Emphasizing that the focus of the statute was on the fault of the
employee,7 4 the court recognized that even repeated warnings "do not
transform incompetence into misconduct if the employee is basically
incapable of the desired level of performance."7 " The claimant,
however, refused to follow the instructions given to her and the
procedures of the workplace.76 The court thus concluded that this
met the requirements of the culpability element.77
5. Summary of Pre-Statute Judicial Opinions
The culpability tests developed by the courts prior to the
promulgation of the statutory definition varied. Even when the
Washington Supreme Court stepped in to heal a divisional split and
generated its own knowing disregard test in Nelson v. Department of
Employment Security,78 the test of culpability was not rigidly fixed.
Five years later, in Macey v. Department of Employment Security, the
court characterized that decision as applying only to conduct unrelated
to the workplace.79 The Macey court developed a principle-based
culpability element, which applied to conduct directly related to the
workplace. However, this culpability element was only implicit within
the opinion. The legislature, reacting to the Macey court's apparent
lack of a culpability element, promulgated its own standard in the form
of a statutory definition of misconduct: "'Misconduct' means an
employee's act or failure to act in willful disregard of his or her

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Tapper, 122 Wash. 2d at 409, 858 P.2d at 502.
74. Id. at 409, 858 P.2d at 501.
75. Id. at 411, 858 P.2d at 502.
76. Id. at 411, 858 P.2d at 503.
77. Id.
78. 98 Wash. 2d 370, 655 P.2d 242 (1982).
79. 110 Wash. 2d at 314-15, 752 P.2d at 376.

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 22:617

employer's interest, where the effect of the employee's act or failure to
act is to harm the employer's business. "80 The first published case
to apply the statutory definition appeared three years later."s
B.

Interpretations of the 1993 Statutory Definition of
Disqualifying Misconduct
1. Intentional Conduct

The first opinion applying the statutory misconduct definition
implied that misconduct must be intentional in order to disqualify a
claimant from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. The
Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Three, in Keenan v.
Employment Security Department 2 stated that the evidence in the
record supported the findings that the claimant's behavior in knocking
a coworker into a filing cabinet was "intentional and willful," 3 and
that she was fired for "willful misconduct." 4 The court, however,
did not elaborate any further on the state of mind necessary for
disqualifying misconduct.
The court was unclear as to the exact holding and failed to
distinguish whether the claimant met the culpability test because (1)
she intentionally committed an act, and that act was determinative of
her disregard of her employer's interests; or (2) she committed an act
and intentionally disregarded her employer's interests.8 ' The difference between the two is subtle: in the first, the claimant must
intentionally commit an act, and in the second, the claimant must
intentionally disregard the employer's interests in committing the act.
Also unclear is whether the test required subjective intent or objective
intent. The determinative evidence of intent was the observations of
the claimant's conduct by her coworkers.
Division Three continued to apply an intentional test for
misconduct in later cases. In Antoni v. Employment Security Department,8 6 an unpublished case, the court applied a subjective, intentional

80. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.04.293 (1993); Act of July 25, 1993, ch. 483, § 1, 1993 Wash.
Laws 2017, 2017.
81. Tapper was not decided under the statute because the claimant was terminated prior to
the effective date of the legislation.
82. 81 Wash. App. 391, 914 P.2d 1191 (1996).
83. Id. at 395, 914 P.2d at 1193.
84. Id. at 393, 914 P.2d at 1192.
85. See id. at 395, 914 P.2d at 1193. The court merely states that "the evidence supports
the ALJ's findings that Ms. Keenan's physical contact with another employee was intentional and
willful." Id.
86. No. 15764-4-I1, 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 1183 (Wash. Ct. App. July 24, 1997).
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test for culpability. The court concluded that there was no disqualifying misconduct when a vehicle-licensing employee was fired for
treating customers rudely." The employer admitted that he did not
believe the employee was "intentionally" rude or that she was
"deliberately" trying to harm his business."8 Based on the employer's
statements, the court affirmed the commissioner's decision that the
claimant did not act willfully.8 9
The Antoni opinion clarified the test applied in Keenan. The
Antoni court distinguished the facts and conclusion of that case from
those in Keenan by emphasizing that in the latter, "the physical contact
was willful within the terms of [the statutory definition]."'" Under
the intentional culpability test applied by Division Three, therefore, the
act must be intentional, but not necessarily performed with the intent
to harm the employer's business.
2. Principle-Based Tests
A second line of cases in Division One has adopted a principlebased culpability test in interpreting the statutory definition. These
cases have used as a guideline the culpability element of the Washington Supreme Court's test for misconduct delineated in Tapper.9 The
principle-based test for interpreting the statutory definition was first
92
adopted in Wilson v. Employment Security Department.
In order to constitute misconduct, an employee's violation of an
employer's rule "must be intentional, grossly negligent, or continue
to take place after notice or warning." Behavior that is mere
incompetence, inefficiency, erroneous judgment, or ordinary
negligence does not constitute misconduct for purposes of denying
unemployment compensation.93

87. Id. at *5.
88. Id. at *4.

89. Id.
90. Id. at *5-*6.
91. Tapper, 122 Wash. 2d at 409, 858 P.2d at 502. Another unpublished Division Three
case, decided after Antoni, used the Tapper test to decide whether misconduct existed. See Patrick
v. Employment Sec. Dept., No. 14683-9-Il, 1998 Wash. App. LEXIS 285 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb.
24, 1998). Because the date of separation was before the effective date of the statutory definition,
the case was decided under the Tapper test, which includes a principle-based culpability standard.
Id. at *5.The determination of culpability was unremarkable. The court held that the claimant's
intentional acts of copying confidential documents after warnings not to do so met the criteria for
the fourth (culpability) element of the Tapper test.
92. 87 Wash. App. 197, 940 P.2d 269 (1997).
93. Id. at 202, 940 P.2d at 272 (quoting Tapper, 122 Wash. 2d at 407, 858 P.2d at 502)
(other citations omitted).
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The Wilson court determined that the actions of the claimant (a
jewelry store manager), who lost diamonds in his possession on two
occasions because of his delay in logging them into the store inventory,
were no more than "negligence, incompetence, or an exercise of poor
judgment."9 4 His negligence also did not follow notice or warn9S
ings.
The Wilson court therefore held that his actions did not constitute
disqualifying misconduct. The claimant intended to comply with store
policy by logging in the diamonds and putting them in a safe.9 6 The
court noted that there was no explicit policy regarding the length of
time the claimant had to log in the diamonds.9 7 Emphasizing that
sufficient grounds for discharge did not necessarily satisfy the
requirements of disqualifying misconduct, the court determined that
since the claimant was not motivated by "defiance, bad faith or
indifference to the consequences of his actions," his conduct did not
98
rise to the level of statutory misconduct.
Several months later, another Division One court, in Galvin v.
Employment Security Department, applied the same principle-based
culpability test.9 9 After reviewing the history of the misconduct
definition, the Galvin court declared that both the new statutory
definition and the principle-based test from Tapper were consistent
with the language of the willful or wanton disregard culpability test
adopted in Shaw.'00 Because there was consistency between the
Tapper principle-based test and the statutory definition, the court
stated that the Wilson court's principle-based culpability test was a fair
interpretation of the legislature's intent in enacting the statutory
definition.1"' The court determined that the claimant was discharged
for disqualifying misconduct when she intentionally left work early to
take care of personal business."0 2 However, she could not be disqualified from receiving benefits solely for uncontrollable absences resulting
03
from her own illness.1

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 202, 940 P.2d at 272.
Id. at 202, 940 P.2d at 273.
Id. at 202, 940 P.2d at 272.
Id. at 203, 940 P.2d at 273.
Id. at 204-05, 940 P.2d at 274.
87 Wash. App. 634, 942 P.2d 1040 (1997).

100.

Id. at 642-43, 942 P.2d at 1044.

101.
102.
103.

Id. at 643-44, 942 P.2d at 1045.
Id. at 645, 942 P.2d at 1145.
Id. at 645, 942 P.2d at 1045.
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The court in Dermond v. Employment Security Department0 4
again affirmed the use of the principle-based test from Tapper in
interpreting the statutory definition. The court stated that the
claimant's continuous refusal to remedy or even discuss questionable
work performance failed to comply with her employer's reasonable
order and was "intentional and came after warning that termination
would occur [and therefore] was not a mere error in judgment. ' 'l '
The court thus held that she had a state of mind sufficient to
disqualify her for misconduct. 106
One opinion, however, was different than the other principlebased cases. In a unique, unpublished opinion from Division Three,
the court in Waters v. Department of Employment Securityl °7 applied
the Macey principle-based test. The claimant, a helicopter pilot for a
private company, failed to check-in as required and was repeatedly
insubordinate and hostile.108 Instead of inferring culpability principles from the opinion, as the Tapper court had done, the Waters court
used the culpability and harm elements of the statutory definition as
a supplement to the other elements of the Macey test.10 9 The court
held that the claimant's conduct amounted to willful disregard of his
employer's interest. 110
C. Summary of Post-Statute Cases
There are two main groupings of cases interpreting the statutory
definition. The Division Three cases apply an intentional culpability
element interpreted directly from the language of the statutory
definition. Waters seems to be an aberration, using the elements from
the statutory definition to add to the test provided in Macey. The
Division One cases clearly adopt the principle-based culpability test
developed in Tapper, which itself was derived from principles
expounded by the Macey court. Division Two has yet to decide a case
involving the statutory definition, although it will have the opportunity
soon. 111 A divisional split has thus developed. This creates an
opportunity for the Washington Supreme Court to heal the divisional

104.
105.

89 Wash. App. 128, 947 P.2d 1271 (1997).
Id. at 133, 947 P.2d at 1274.

106. See id.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

No. 15214-6-III, 1997 WL 328799 (Wash. Ct. App. June 17, 1997).
Id.at *1-*2.
Id.at *4.
Id.
See supra note 11.
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split and allow businesses, attorneys, and the Department to apply a
uniform standard.
III. THE NELSON KNOWING DISREGARD TEST:
THE MOST APPROPRIATE TEST FOR INTERPRETING
THE STATUTORY DEFINITION

The culpability tests currently applied by the courts of appeal are
not the most appropriate to use in interpreting the statutory definition.
Nor are they the interpretations intended by the legislature in
promulgating the statute. Rather, the knowing disregard culpability
test delineated in Nelson v. Department of Employment Security is the
most appropriate interpretation of the statutory definition."'
How would a court or an administrative law judge apply a
knowing conduct test? There are two considerations: (1) whether the
test is based on objective or subjective knowledge, and (2) what is
meant by someone acting "with knowledge."
Should the knowing conduct culpability standard use an objective
or subjective test? The culpability element ("with intent or knowledge
that the employer's interest would suffer")" 3 would be applied very
differently depending on which test was used. An objective test would
be based on the actions of a reasonable person in the shoes of the
worker. The behavior of any given worker would be compared with
the behavior of this reasonable person. Did the worker act when a
reasonable person would realize that this particular conduct would be
against the employer's interests? If so, the worker has acted in willful
disregard of his employer's interests.
A subjective test, on the other hand, would focus solely on the
worker's state of mind at the time of the alleged misconduct. Did the
worker act with actual knowledge that the employer's interests would
suffer? If so, the worker has acted in willful disregard of his employer's interests.
The objective test is the better test for purposes of defining
instances of misconduct. While the wording of the knowing disregard
element, as well as the misconduct statute, might imply a focus on the
subjective state of mind of the worker, an objective test would be more
consistent in its application and easier to apply. Although there could
be no per se legal standard defining a particular behavior as misconduct in all contexts, an objective test allows for more consistent
decisions by eliminating consideration of an individual's particular

112.
113.

98 Wash. 2d at 375, 655 P.2d at 245.
Id.
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psychological idiosyncrasies. Instead, focus is placed on a generic
person in the particular situation and context of the claimant. In
addition, shifting the focus away from an individual's state of mind
would eliminate the need for the finder of fact to determine retrospectively the actual thought processes of the worker, making the test easier
to apply than a subjective test. An objective test would also be more
faithful to the intent of the legislature.' 14
Using the culpability standards more fully developed in other
areas of law will help in determining when one acts with knowledge.
Under Washington criminal law, a person acts knowingly or with
knowledge when she has information which would lead a reasonable
person similarly situated to be aware of facts, circumstances, or results
described by a criminal statute."' In the criminal context, a person
acts "willfully" by, inter alia, acting knowingly." 6
Translating the criminal standards into a form usable for our
purposes, an employee would act with knowledge as required by the
knowing disregard element if she was aware of facts or circumstances
which would lead a reasonable person in the same situation to believe
that her action would be against or probably cause harm to her
employer's interest. As in the criminal statute, willful disregard would
be satisfied by acting with knowledge. This definition of knowledge
is broader than actual, subjective knowledge. It is much closer to the
concept of constructive knowledge.
Applying this test to a hypothetical will be helpful. A truck
driver employee is speeding down a wet road, driving too fast for
safety under the weather conditions. He has an accident and exposes
the employer to liability for property damage and injury. As the driver
did not intend to cause the accident, an intentional conduct test would
allow him to receive benefits. To apply the principle-based test from
Wilson, the court would focus on whether the truck driver was grossly
negligent or was previously cited for reckless driving.
Using the knowing disregard test, however, the court would focus
on an objective test: whether a reasonable truck driver would deduce

114. See infra Part III.A.
115. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010 (1996).
(1)(b) Knowledge. A person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge when:
(i) he is aware of a fact, facts, or circumstances or result described by a statute
defining an offense; or
(ii) he has information which would lead a reasonable man in the same situation
to believe that facts exist which facts are described by a statute defining an
offense.
116. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(4) (1996).
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from his speeding on a rainy day that he has increased his chances of
an accident, which would probably be against the employer's interests?
By speeding on a rainy day, when a reasonable truck driver would slow
down, the truck driver employee disregards his employer's interest in
preventing accidents that lead to liability, and thereby engages in
disqualifying misconduct.
The knowing disregard test detailed above is the test most
consistent with both the legislature's intent in creating the statutory
definition and the policies and purposes of the Employment Security
Act.
A.

Legislative History

The legislative history of the statute is the strongest evidence
supporting the use of the knowing disregard culpability element in
interpreting the statutory definition. The Final Legislative Report
characterized the purpose of the statute: to define disqualifying
misconduct and to supersede a Washington Supreme Court definition
of misconduct, which was overly broad and required neither a
culpability element nor harm to the employer's interest.17 The
House Bill Report on the statute identified the Macey test (which
implicitly included the principle-based standard) as the case law test to
be replaced." 8 The purpose of the bill was to limit the definition of
misconduct, and thus expand the number of eligible claimants for
unemployment benefits from the number who would be allowed under
Macey.119
A memo written on the proposed definition of misconduct by a
staff attorney for the Senate Committee on Labor and Commerce 2 '
criticized the Macey decision, and proposed the test developed in
Nelson, including its knowing disregard culpability element, as an
appropriate interpretation of the statutory definition."' The memo
cited and followed the Macey dissent closely, criticizing the majority
decision as (1) not requiring intent/knowledge of the harmful nature

117. State of Wash., 1993 Final Legis. Report on Regulating Unemployment Insurance, S.
53-ESSB 5702, Reg. Sess. 288 (Wash. 1993).
118. H.R. 53-ESSB 5702, Reg. Sess. 2 (Wash. 1993).
119. S. 53-SB 5464, Reg. Sess. 1 (Wash. 1993).
120. Senate Comm. on Labor & Commerce, Memorandum on Definition of "Misconduct,"
S. 53-SB 5464, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1993). Written by David Cheal on March 11, 1993, this memo
[hereinafter Misconduct Memo] was sent to Christine Cordes, his counterpart at the House
Committee on Commerce and Labor (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
121. Id. The memo was actually written on SB 5464. SB 5464 was the statute which
originated the misconduct definition found in WASH. REV. CODE § 50.04.293. It was subsumed
into ESSB 5702 by an amendment. The latter bill eventually became law.
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of their behavior, (2) not requiring harm to the employer, (3) being
logically inconsistent and superfluous in some areas, and
(4) requiring
1 22
one test for on-duty conduct and another for off-duty.
The memo noted that both the majority and dissent in Macey
cited the overall purpose of the Act: "to protect against the impact of
involuntary unemployment through no fault of the employee."'' 23 As
discussed in many court cases, this purpose placed the focus of a
court's attention on the degree of fault of the employee, creating a
fault-based unemployment compensation system. The memo also
restated the policy of unemployment insurance: "benefits should be
available to those otherwise eligible except in the clearest of cases-where the conduct that led to termination is so clearly culpable as
to amount to voluntary unemployment.' 1 24 The Macey court's
opinion did not explicitly require a culpability element in its test, but
nonetheless rejected negligence as sufficient to constitute disqualifying
misconduct. The memo author asked how one could find fault without
12
some standard of culpability.
In contrast to his criticism of Macey, the author of the memo
argued that the proposed statutory definition included all of the
elements of the Nelson test, 126 including the knowing conduct culpability requirement. Both the Nelson test and the statutory definition
required actual harm to the employer's interest. The "willful disregard
of the employer's interest" culpability element of the statutory
definition corresponded to the requirements of intentional or knowing
conduct that violated expected behavior contracted for between
employer and employee. The employer's interest was inferred from
the contract. The employee's willful disregard of the employer's
interests could be shown by either intentional disregard, or conduct
done with actual or constructive knowledge that the employer's
27
interests would suffer.
122. Misconduct Memo, supra note 120, at 2; see also Macey, 110 Wash. 2d at 324, 752
P.2d at 380 (Dore, J., dissenting).
123. Misconduct Memo, supra note 120, at 2.
124. Id. (citing Macey, 110 Wash. 2d at 324, 752 P.2d at 380).
125. Id.
126. The first element of the Nelson test requires nexus with the employee's work, which

is not part of the statutory definition. However, this Comment argues that this is not necessary,
as WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.060 states that an employee can be disqualified for misconduct
"connected with his or her work." Therefore, the nexus element is provided by the disqualifying
misconduct statute (WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.060) and is not required to be part of the

statutory definition of misconduct laid out in WASH. REV. CODE § 50.04.293. Of course, the
conduct must still meet the requirement of being connected with work.
127. The memo notes: "Employers are apparently concerned about the knowledge element,
in particular that it could be construed to mean actual knowledge, or sometimes referred to as
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The legislative history supports the application of the knowing
disregard culpability test in interpreting the culpability element of the
statutory definition of misconduct. The main purpose of the statutory
definition was to overrule the Macey Court's opinion. An ancillary
purpose was to reduce the number of disqualifications for misconduct
produced by the overly broad Macey test. The research memo drafted
for the Senate committee that was considering the statutory definition
supported the use of the Nelson test, including its knowing disregard
culpability element, as the best interpretation of the statutory definition. As the memo was part of the committee files, the Nelson test and
its knowing disregard element was arguably in the minds of members
of both committees when they recommended the statutory definition
to the Legislature.
No other interpretation is supported by the legislative history. An
interpretation of the misconduct definition using an intentional test is
not supported because of its omission in both the memo and the
language of the statute. The legislature certainly could have used
"intentional" or "purposeful" as the sole culpability test; many
Washington courts have used that language as part of their culpability
tests since the first standard set out in Willard.'28 Therefore, the
intentional culpability requirement in Division Three's recent cases is
not supported by legislative history.
To the extent that the principle-based culpability test applied in
Tapper was based implicitly on the Macey opinion, the refutation by
the legislature of the Macey test would apply also to the principlebased culpability test derived from Tapper and used by Division One
(i.e., Wilson and its progeny). Neither the intentional nor the
principle-based tests, therefore, are supported by the legislative history.
The legislature clearly intended a test closer to the knowing disregard
test.

subjective intent. The bill could be amended to limit the intent requirement to an objective
standard, i.e., what a reasonable person should have known in the circumstances." Misconduct
Memo, supra note 120, at 2. It suggests possible express language in the statute which would
define "willful" as an "imputed appreciation of the logical and natural consequences of one's acts
or omissions as understood by a person of reasonable intelligence and perception," but this was
never included in an amendment. Id.
128. See, e.g., Tapper v. Employment Sec. Dept., 122 Wash. 2d 397, 858 P.2d 494 (1993);
Macey v. Dept. of Employment Sec., 110 Wash. 2d 308, 752 P.2d 372 (1988).
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B.

Policy

Using a knowledge-based culpability test also furthers the policy
goals of the Employment Security Act. The Preamble to the Act states
that the overall purpose of the Act is to "benefit . . . persons unemployed through no fault of their own."' 29 The Act should be liberally construed for the purpose of reducing involuntary unemployment
and the suffering caused by involuntary unemployment. 3 '
Some courts have focused on the fault of the employee by asking
the question of whether the employee's "unemployment is in effect
voluntary." 3 ' As the fund providing benefits to unemployment
compensation claimants is made up mostly of employer contributions,
it would be unfair to employers for the fund to compensate employees
who were discharged for misconduct.'3 2 In addition, courts have
recognized that the misconduct disqualification is penal in nature and
However,
serves as a general deterrent to employee misconduct.'
for
firing an
cause
good
between
they have also made a distinction
employee and disqualifying misconduct under the Employment
Security Act.' 34 Disqualifying misconduct is necessarily a higher
standard.
As a whole, the policy informing the Employment Security Act
promotes a balanced approach. To focus solely on protecting all
claimants and construing the Act liberally would allow for benefits to
those terminated for serious misconduct. This would place a serious
burden on the unemployment compensation fund and eliminate
whatever deterrent effects a misconduct disqualification would provide.
However, to focus solely on protecting the fund and employers from
those claimants fired for cause and punishing claimants for unintentional conduct would undermine the express purpose of the Act to
reduce the suffering caused by involuntary unemployment. Therefore,
a balanced approach is called for.
The policy goals of the Employment Security Act are protected by
using the knowing disregard test set out in Nelson. By requiring the
employee's purposeful intent or constructive knowledge that her
conduct would harm the employer's interests, the test puts the focus

129. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.01.010 (1996).
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Tapper, 122 Wash. 2d. at 409, 858 P.2d at 501.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Wilson v. Employment Sec. Dept., 87 Wash. App. 197, 204-05, 940 P.2d
269, 274 (1997).
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of the court's investigation on the employee's actions in light of his
motivation and knowledge. This culpability test would disallow
benefits only in cases where there is actual harm to the employer
caused by the employee who knew or should have known (based on
facts known to him) that the employer's interests might be harmed
because of his actions. This aspect protects claimants who were fired
for cause, but not for bad faith or unreasonable acts. The test allows
benefits only to those claimants who could not reasonably foresee harm
to an employer's interests from their actions. This aspect protects the
fund and employers from paying unemployment benefits to claimants
terminated for intentional misconduct or unreasonable acts which the
employee should have known would cause harm to the employer.
Thus, the knowing disregard culpability test still promotes a deterrent
effect.
Other options do not further the policy goals. If no culpability
element were required, such as in a test for misconduct requiring only
a rule violation, the policy goals focusing on fault and a liberal
interpretation of the Act benefiting the claimant would not be
supported. A search for fault that amounts to voluntary termination,
a higher standard than that necessary for discharge, requires a focus on
the state of mind of the employee. Without a culpability test, the
search for "voluntary" termination would be irrelevant. Every
employee who was terminated for cause would simultaneously be
unable to collect unemployment benefits, eliminating the distinction
between the two.
Likewise, the principle-based culpability test is too broad in
disqualifying claimants from benefits. It includes grossly negligent
acts, which by its definition are not included in knowing or intentional
conduct. It would disqualify from benefits claimants who in their
particular situation could not reasonably foresee the results of their
actions. Gross negligence is also a vague concept and not amenable to
clear definition, which would lead to unpredictable results.
At the other extreme, if purposeful disregard of the employer's
interest were required, a determination of misconduct could be
extremely rare, hurting employers and the court system. Employers
would be legitimately frustrated with the compensation system to
which they contribute. Employees who committed gross wrongs
against their employers would be allowed unemployment benefits at
the expense of their employers. The courts would spend much of their
time trying to understand the thoughts of the employee at the time of
his or her conduct-a nearly impossible task. Having available an
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objective test for determining knowing disregard, the agency and courts
may efficiently go about their task of determining misconduct.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The definition of disqualifying misconduct has been changed
many times by Washington courts in the history of the Employment
Security Act, especially in the last fifteen years. The legislature
intervened in 1993 to codify a definition which met the policies and
purposes of the Act. As there is again a split among the Divisions of
the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court of Washington might
ultimately decide the correct interpretation of the new statutory
definition. Based on the policies of the Employment Security Act and
the legislative history of the statutory definition of misconduct, this
Comment contends that the correct interpretation of the culpability
element found in the statutory definition is that of a knowing disregard
culpability test-specifically the test found in Nelson. This standard,
rather than the tests adopted by the Courts of Appeal, best balances
the policies of the Employment Security Act and includes the
culpability requirement intended by the Legislature when that body
enacted the statutory definition codified in Wash. Rev. Code
50.04.293.
EPILOGUE

Since this Comment was finalized, a Division Two panel issued
an opinion interpreting the statutory definition of misconduct
differently than Divisions One and Three. Independent of the
positions taken by the parties or the opinions of other courts, the court
in Hamel v. Employment Sec. Dep't135 developed its own test for
misconduct, with a "should have known" culpability element: [A]n
employee acts with willful disregard when he (1) is aware of his
employer's interest; (2) knows or should have known that certain
conduct jeopardizes that interest; but (3) nonetheless intentionally
performs the act, willfully disregarding its probable consequences.136
The "should have known" standard requires an intentional act, but the
actor need not intend harm to the employer or even subjectively know
that his actions will probably harm the interests of the employer."3 7

135. 1998 Wash. Ct. App. No. 22919-6-II, 966 P.2d 1282.
136. Id. at 19, 966 P.2d at 1286.
137. Id. at 20, 966 P.2d at 1286.
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This is an objective test, relying on whether a "reasonable person"
would consider an act harmful to an employer's interest.'38
The Hamel court rejected the principle-based test 139 of the
Macey and Tapper courts both because the test was superseded by the
statutory definition, and because the test allowed a court to find
misconduct solely on the basis of "repeated warnings."140 Consequently, the court criticized Division One cases for adopting the
principle-based culpability element for use in interpreting the statutory
definition.' 4 ' While "repeated warnings" cannot be the sole reason
to deny benefits, the court said, such warnings might provide "strong
evidence of the employee's knowledge that the conduct is inconsistent
with the employer's interest."' 42
Applying the "should have known" standard, the court held that
Hamel willfully disregarded his employer's interests. Hamel, in spite
of two reprimands and knowing about Red Robin's strict written policy
against sexual harassment, made inappropriate, sexual comments to
Hamel was "aware of
coworkers or customers on three occasions.'
Red Robin's interest in preventing sexual harassment."' 4 4 The court
held that Hamel knew or should have known what a "reasonable
person" would know, specifically that Hamel's conduct could harm his
employer's interest.' 45 Finally, the court found that Hamel intentionally made those comments. 46 The court thus held that the actions
by Hamel met the statutory definition of misconduct and that
unemployment compensation benefits should be denied.' 47
The knowing disregard culpability element proposed by this
Comment is nearly identical to the "should have known" standard
developed in Hamel, as both are objective standards based on what the
employee knew or should have known.'48 The knowing disregard

138. Id.
139. Id. at
15-16, 966 P.2d at 1286; See infra Part II.A.4. The culpability element
implicit in Macey v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 110 Wash.2d 308, 318, 752 P.2d 372, 377-78
(1988), and explicitly set out in Tapper v. Employment Sec. Dept, 122 Wash. 2d 397, 409, 858
P.2d 494, 502 (1993), states that "[t]he violations must be intentional, grossly negligent, or
continue to take place after notice or warnings. That is, the behavior cannot be characterized as
mere incompetence, inefficiency, erroneous judgment, or ordinary negligence."
140. Id. at
15 22, 966 P.2d at 1285-86; See infra Part II.A.4.
141. Id. at 23, 966 P.2d at 1287; See infra Part II.A.4.
142. Id.
1-6, 966 P.2d at 1284.
143. Id. at
144. Id. at 20, 966 P.2d at 1286.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 23, 966 P.2d at 1286.
148. See infra Part III (referring to infra Part II.A.3).
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element requires that an employee's conduct be "(a) violative of some
code of behavior contracted for between employer and employee, and
(b) done with intent or knowledge that the employer's interest would
suffer."' 49 An act is "done with intent or knowledge" when the actor
is "aware of facts or circumstances which would lead a reasonable
person in the same situation to believe that her action would be against
or probably cause harm to her employer's interests."'5 ° Part (a) of
the knowing disregard culpability element corresponds directly to the
first part of the Hamel court's "should have known" standard, that the
employee is "aware of his employer's interest." The primary means by
which an employee becomes aware of the interests of his employer is
through contracts and express policies. Part (b) of the knowing
disregard culpability element corresponds directly to parts (2) and (3)
of the "should have known" test, since both require that an employee
think and act as a reasonable person in the same situation. Under
both, an employee is denied benefits if he should have known that an
act would probably cause harm to his employer's interest, and yet he
acts nonetheless.
The test for misconduct proposed by this Comment and the test
generated by the Hamel court are consistent with each other.
Therefore, for the reasons stated in Part III of this Comment, unlike
the tests generated by Divisions One and Three, the "should have
known" standard of the Hamel court is supported by both the
legislative history of the statutory definition and the policy goals of the
Employment Security Act.''

149. See infra Part II.A.3 (quoting Nelson v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 98 Wash. 2d 370,
375, 655 P.2d 242, 245 (1982)).
150. See infra Part III.
151. Division Two has heard arguments and is now considering another case involving the
statutory definition: Rice v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 1997 Wash. Ct. App. No. 22615-4-I.

